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ENTERTAINMENT LAW – THE SPECTER OF 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AND 
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS 
JACK P. SAHL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is significant risk today that lawyers will become the target of a 
disciplinary or legal malpractice action, especially given the complexity of the 
law and advances in technology that reduce the amount of time that lawyers 
have to reflect about client matters.1  This risk is heightened by the increased 
competition in the bar to deliver legal services in a cost-effective manner, the 
sophistication of clients who expect competent, efficient and reasonably priced 
services, and the litigious nature of consumers.2  The risk is further 
 *     Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional 
Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law.  I would like to thank my research 
assistants, Tracy Signet and Shane McCammon, who assisted me in researching and writing this 
article, and Danielle Moskos, Brenna Fasko, William Shelly, Mike Rasor, and Stephanie Haight who 
helped with annual revisions.  This article is a revised version of an earlier work that was originally 
published by the Practising Law Institute in March of 2010, and has since been edited by the 
Marquette Sports Law Review editorial staff.       
1. Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics: Part 1, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 2 
(2004).  See generally Ameet Sachdev, Total Attorneys: Chicago-Based Firm Under Fire, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 13, 2009, at Business Section, 1 (reporting that Connecticut is investigating, for possible 
violation of its advertising rules, a legal information website, TotalBankruptcy.com, that provides 
certain lawyers the exclusive rights to contact consumers generated by the site in return for lawyers 
paying sixty-five dollars per contact).  
2. Sachdev, supra note 1.  Consumers may be more litigious concerning certain types of legal or 
business services.  See Stewards of James Brown Estate Sue Morgan Stanley, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2008, at C3 (discussing a dispute over the estate of the legendary soul singer, James Brown, and 
stating “it is not atypical for estate lawyers or court-appointed trustees to sue former business 
managers, [although] it is unusual for them to sue the banks that managed the accounts overseen by 
the former business managers . . . .”).  See also Washington v. Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (concerning, in part, a common dispute in the entertainment 
industry where talent refused to pay for the services of a personal manager claiming that he acted as 
an employment agency in violation of the state’s “theatrical employment agency” statute) [hereinafter 
Escobar).  The statute involved in Escobar, N.Y. Gen. Bus Law Section 171 section (8), was held to 
apply to a booking agent who secured lectures and other engagements for a prominent theatrical and 
motion picture industry personality.  See generally Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 395 N.Y.S.2d 611 
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) cf. Park v. Deftones, 84 Cal Rptr.2d 616 (1999) (voiding a contact under the 
California Labor Code between a band and a personal manager because he secured performance 
engagements without being licensed as a talent agency); Stan Soocher, ‘Unlicensed Agent’ Won’t 
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exacerbated by the ever-changing methods and rules for electronic 
communication and the storage of information.3  The magnitude of the risk is 
underscored by the prediction that law school graduates will be the subject of 
three or more claims of legal malpractice before finishing a career.4  
This article examines some good practice standards that minimize the risk 
that a lawyer will become the target of a legal malpractice or disciplinary 
action.  These standards should also reduce the risk of a lawyer becoming the 
object of a disqualification or Rule 11 motion.5  This article discusses these 
Stop Suit by Manager, 25 ENT. L. & FIN.  5 (2009) (discussing Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 N.Y. 
Misc. LEXIS 2596). 
3. Experts have noted the new landscape concerning electronic communication and the storage of 
information.  See generally George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal 
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007).  For example,  
There has been a civilization-wide morph, or pulse, or one might say that information has 
evolved.  But quite recently there has been an evolutionary burst in writing technology–a 
jagged punctuation on a 50 century-long sine wave.  A quick succession of advances 
clustered or synced together, to emerge into a radically new and more powerful writing 
technology.  These include digitization; real time computing; the microprocessor; the 
personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading to the Internet; the 
evolution of software, which has “locked in” seamless editing as an almost universal 
function; the World Wide Web; and of course people and their technique.  These 
constituents have swirled into an information complex, now known as the “Information 
Ecosystem.” 
Id. at 1, 5-7.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which is 
generally considered the first definitive case dealing with the wide range of electronic discovery 
issues in litigation.  In this case, the court held that a plaintiff was entitled to discover all relevant 
emails which had been deleted and were now only on back up disks on the defendant’s computers.  
See also, Jack P. Sahl, The New Era—Qua Vadis 43 AKRON L.  REV.  1, (2010) (discussing the 
Miller-Becker Institute for Professional Responsibility Inaugural Symposium, “Lawyers Beyond 
Borders”  and “Practicing Law in the Electronic Age”). 
4. Ronald, E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice: A Look at the Trends, TRIAL, Jul. 1, 1997, available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Legal+malpractice:+a+look+at+the+trends.-a019634474.  See  
generally JEFFREY M. SMITH & RONALD E. MALLEN, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 2 § 1.1 
(2nd ed.1996) [hereinafter SMITH & MALLEN]. 
5. Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 591 (2006) (providing an example of a 
successful disqualification motion in an entertainment related case, albeit in an unusual setting 
involving a prosecutor and her office).  In Haraguchi, the court upheld the disqualification of a Santa 
Barbara County district attorney from working on a rape by intoxication case because of her 
entertainment activities.  The district attorney had self-published a novel, “Intoxicating Agent,” that 
concerned rape by intoxication which she was promoting while prosecuting an identical charge 
against the petitioner-defendant.  The court found “sufficient factual similarities between the novel 
and the petitioner-defendant’s case to suggest that the district attorney [relied] on petitioner’s case for 
plot lines.”  Id. at 596.  The court noted that “[n]o current public employee should be permitted to 
exploit his or her official position as a lever to earn extra private income where such will inure to the 
detriment of the employer.”  Id.  The court found a disabling conflict of interest in Haraguchi 
because, in part, there is a “reasonable possibility that the [district attorney] may not exercise her 
discretionary functions in an evenhanded manner.”  Id. at 597.  The district attorney’s interest in 
seeing “her book succeed will trump her duty as a prosecutor to see that justice is done and to accord 
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standards in the entertainment law context but they also apply to a variety of 
practice areas, for example, sports law.6  
II.  SCREENING THE CASE AND CLIENT 
One of the most important and difficult decisions an entertainment lawyer 
makes is the decision to represent a particular client.7  Client representation 
may subject the lawyer to a variety of risks, for example, third-party lawsuits 
for tortious interference with contract,8 tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage,9 defamation,10 and Rule 11 sanctions.11  Lawyers 
to defendants their constitutional rights.”  Id.    
 6.  Many courts have held that attorney-agents are bound by their state’s lawyer ethical rules when 
representing athletes.  See generally Melissa Neiman, Fair Game: Ethical Considerations in 
Negotiation by Sports Agents, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 129 (2007) (discussing conflicts of 
interest and reasonableness of fees as they apply to sports attorneys and agents); see also Gary P. 
Konn, Sports Agents Representing Professional Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to Say 
You’re Qualified, 6 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 7, 15 (1988) (suggesting, in part, ways to avoid 
incompetency in the area of sports representation).  See generally In re Dwight, 573 P.2d. 481, 484 
(Az. 1977) (holding in a non-sports context that an attorney who is engaged in the practice of law 
“may not defend his actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional 
activity”).   
7. See David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice and the Eternal 
Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 373 n.89 (1997/1998) 
(quoting Robert E. O’Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REV. 
325, 361 (1989) (proposing that “[s]ome of the worst claims in the history of the legal profession are 
directly attributable to the bad judgment of an individual partner in accepting a new client”)).   
8. Source Entm’t. Group, LLC v. Baldonado & Assocs, P.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 
(D.N.J. 2007).  Source Entertainment, a management and entertainment company, signed a 
management agreement with a minor, Tiffany Evans.  Id. at *1.  The management agreement was 
subsequently approved by a New Jersey Superior Court.  Source obtained a record deal with Sony 
Music, agency representation with William Morris, and a steady stream of acting jobs and singing 
performances.  Id. at *2.  Evans allegedly became unhappy with Source and contracted with 
Baldonado & Associates (Baldonado), the defendant law firm, to represent Evans in all aspects of her 
entertainment career.  Id.  Baldonado sent a letter to Source purportedly terminating its management 
contract with Evans.  Id.  The district court dismissed Baldonado’s motion for a judgment on the 
pleadings and ruled that at this stage Source had stated a valid claim for tortious interference of 
existing contractual relations, tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage, 
and defamation.  Id. at *8.  In New Jersey, a tortious interference with contract claim requires the 
plaintiff to show “(1) it was a party to an existing contractual relationship; (2) the defendant 
intentionally interfered with that contractual relationship; (3) the interference was undertaken with 
malice; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages resulting from the interference.”  Id. at 4.  See Tortious-
Interference Claims, 5 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (Aug. 2007) (explaining briefly the holding in Source Entm’t 
Group, LLC). 
9. See generally Source Entm’t Group, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 (D.N.J. 2007).  For a 
“tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage” claim, the plaintiff must 
prove “(1) it had a continuing or prospective economic relationship or reasonable expectation of 
economic advantage; (2) the defendant knew of the contract or relationship of expectance; (3) the 
interference was done intentionally or without justification or excuse; (4) it is reasonably probable 
that the plaintiff’s loss was a result of defendant’s interference and (5) damages resulted from the 
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nevertheless often expose themselves to the risks associated with client 
representation by accepting employment based on inadequate information 
about the client and his or her effect on the firm’s practice.12 
interference.”  Id. at 6.  
10. Id.  In Source Entertainment Group, LLC, the defendant law firm sent a letter purportedly 
terminating Source’s management contract with the artist, Tiffany Evans, to third parties, such as 
Sony Records and the William Morris Agency.  The district court permitted the plaintiff to proceed 
with its defamation claim and noted that defendant’s letter stated that Source “continually mistreated 
Tiffany.”  Id. at *7.  The district court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that they were immune 
from liability under the so-called “litigation privilege” because they were attempting to protect 
Tiffany’s right to disaffirm the management contract.  Id.  “Under the litigation privilege, an attorney 
is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matters concerning another so long as the 
communication was “‘(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other 
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) have some 
connection or logical relation to the action.’”  Id. (citing Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995) 
(quoting Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 460 (Law Div. 1977)).  The district court held that 
the defendants’ defamatory statements were not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.  
Although New Jersey law does not limit the litigation privilege to courtroom statements, none of the 
other contexts in which the litigation privilege attaches, such as statements made during settlement 
negotiations and private conferences with an attorney regarding litigation, were applicable.  Id. at 7. 
11. See generally Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, 2007 WL 1435395 (N.D. Tex. 2007).  The 
plaintiffs, recording companies that owned or controlled copyrighted sound recordings, sued Diane 
Heslep for copyright infringement by peer-to-peer file sharing.  Id. at *3.  Heslep argued that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys should be sanctioned under Rule 11 because Heslep “established that she was at 
work at the exact date [January 6, 2005] and time the amended complaint alleges she was online 
infringing on Plaintiffs’ copyrights, that AOL has confirmed that she was not herself online at the 
specific date and time in question, and that AOL could not identify the specific computer in use at the 
date and time in question.”  Id. at *5.  The district court found evidence that suggested that Heslep’s 
assertions were disingenuous, and it noted that Heslep did not deny infringing on the plaintiffs’ 
copyrights “‘on other occasions on or before January 6, 2005.’”  Id. at **4, 6.  The court ruled that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys acted reasonably in attempting to resolve the dispute with Heslep and that their 
conduct did not merit sanctioning.  Id. at 6.  However, the court sanctioned Heslep’s lawyer under 
Rule 11 because she filed a frivolous Rule 11 motion against the plaintiffs’ lawyers for the purpose of 
harassment.  The frivolous motion also unnecessarily increased litigation costs.  Id. at *8.  See also 
Downloading Suits/Rule 11 Sanctions, 23 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (2007) (briefly discussing the holding in 
Atlantic Recording Corp.). 
12. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 83.   “A significant cause of claims against 
attorneys is the acceptance of new matters, whether from new, current or former clients, without 
sufficient analysis of the clients and the transactions.”  Id.  One of the risks confronting lawyers is that 
they may be criticized because of the type of clients they represent or their clients’ conduct.  For 
example, the music industry in piracy cases was portrayed in the media as the “heavy” for prosecuting 
teenage offenders.  See Samantha Chang, Legal Matters: Piracy Showdown Likely in High Court, 
BILLBOARD, Oct. 12, 2003 (quoting entertainment lawyer and associate professor Stan Soocher).  The 
entertainment lawyers who represented the music industry risked being viewed in a similar light.  
Another significant risk is that the client will not pay the lawyer’s fee.  See e.g., Musburger v. Meier, 
914 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  In Musburger, the lawyer represented a radio personality who 
agreed to pay attorney fees, expenses, and five percent of the gross amount of the contracts that he 
negotiated for Meier.  Id. at 1201-02.  In affirming a jury award of $68,750, the court held that an 
attorney who is representing a client on a contingent fee basis is entitled to quantum meruit recovery 
when discharged.  Id. at 1209; Stan Soocher, Radio Personality Must Pay for Lawyer’s Services, ENT. 
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There are several considerations and steps at the intake stage of the 
lawyer-client relationship that can provide lawyers with more information 
about the risks associated with accepting specific employment.13  This 
information and an understanding of the profession’s ethics rules will help 
lawyers avoid becoming the target of a malpractice or disciplinary action.14   
The first step for minimizing the likelihood of a malpractice or 
disciplinary action is for the lawyer to conduct the initial client interview in a 
manner that elicits a good understanding of the client’s concerns and 
objectives.15  As the professional, the lawyer bears significant responsibility 
for effectively communicating with the client given the lawyer’s training, 
knowledge, and authority to act on behalf of the client.  The balance of power 
in the initial lawyer-client interview is often skewed heavily in favor of the 
lawyer, so it is incumbent upon him or her to be sensitive, resourceful, and 
professional during the interview to gain not only important information but 
also the client’s confidence.  The lawyer’s use of non-leading and open-ended 
questions and the encouragement of client narratives about his or her situation 
are often effective approaches for promoting full disclosure and 
understanding.16  The lawyer’s use of leading questions and follow-up 
comments should help the lawyer shape the direction of the interview and 
facilitate greater disclosure.17   
LAW & FIN. 1, 3 (2009).   
13. See SMITH & MALLEN supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87-88.  
14. This article primarily cites provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
“Model Rules”) adopted in 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT].  The Model Rules have been amended over the years and were substantially 
modified in August 2001, and February and August 2002 “as a result of changes proposed by the 
ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, popularly called ‘Ethics, 
2000.’” See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
1 (2008).  Some version of the Model Rules is followed by almost every state, although some states 
have retained concepts found in the predecessor code, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 
(the “Code”) adopted in 1969 [hereinafter MODEL CODE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY].  See MORGAN & 
ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 12-13 (2006).  
15. It is important that the lawyer attempt to avoid interruptions during the interview, 
demonstrate an interest in the client’s story, and where appropriate, express support for the client’s 
predicament.  This should build trust and rapport with the client.  During the interview, the lawyer 
should also note important facts or questions in writing and apprise the client that subsequent 
communications or interviews may be necessary before undertaking representation.  See NOELLE C. 
NELSON, CONNECTING WITH YOUR CLIENT xi (1996) (discussing communication techniques at the 
initial interview stage and emphasizing that “[t]he key to delivering legal services in a way that 
ensures client cooperation and satisfaction is communication”).  
16. Id. at 32-33 (recommending “[o]pen-ended questions [that] allow clients to talk about their 
problems or concerns from their point of view”).   
17. Id. at 35 (reporting that once the lawyer has established a rapport with the client “by asking 
open-ended questions and appreciating the answers,” the lawyer should “move on to narrowly 
focused questions to get the specific answers you need”).   
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Determining the client’s objectives is particularly important for the 
entertainment lawyer who also may be working as an agent or manager while 
practicing law.18  For example, an artist may want a lawyer to provide legal 
representation on a contingent fee basis while also managing the artist’s 
personal affairs.19  Because the roles of a manager and a lawyer can differ, the 
lawyer should ascertain the precise nature and scope of services the client 
wishes the lawyer to perform to preclude any confusion.20 
Second, the lawyer should ascertain the client’s reasons for seeking the 
lawyer’s services.21  The client’s reasons may range from reports about the 
firm’s strong reputation for good work to its reasonable fee structure and 
policy regarding the advancement of litigation-related expenses.22  Educating 
the client about the firm’s policies is especially critical at the intake stage 
because it diminishes the likelihood that the client may feel deceived or 
betrayed about the basis for employment.  The lawyer should correct any 
misconceptions about the firm—for example, that a particular lawyer will staff 
the case or that the firm’s relationship with another party, such as a film or 
record company, will produce success.   
Lawyers also should consider the intake stage a valuable opportunity to 
assess the effectiveness of their marketing efforts.  For example, a client may 
inform the lawyer that the firm’s advertising prompted the client’s visit.  If the 
18. See Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics Part 2: Agents, Managers 
and Lawyers, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2, 4 (2005); Kenneth J. Abdo, Shopping Record Deals for 
Lawyers: A&R Approach and Ethics Issues, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4-5 (2005).  This is also an 
important consideration for attorneys working in the sports law field.  See Neiman, supra note 6, at 
125 (reporting that more than fifty percent of all agents for professional athletes are lawyers). 
19. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18.  The fiduciary duty of non-lawyer managers may be more 
circumscribed than that of lawyer-managers who understand contractual terms.  See generally  Reznor 
v. J. Artist Mgmt., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing Nine Inch Nails lead singer 
Trent Reznor’s motion for summary judgment).  In the motion, Reznor claimed that his manager had 
breached his fiduciary duty, but the court held that that a jury could find that, because his manager 
was not a lawyer, “he did not understand” the terms now at issue and he thus “fulfilled whatever duty 
he owed Reznor by disclosing all the material terms and facts of which he was aware.”  Id. at 575.  
See also Recent Cases, 27 ENT. L. RPTR. 7 (2005) (reporting that the court also dismissed Reznor’s 
claim that the management contract was unconscionable). 
20. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that managers negotiate contracts, provide 
business assistance, and often “nurture the artist’s career,” while lawyers shop talent and creative 
material, provide financial advice, and protect the client’s interests under the governance of 
applicable ethical guidelines).  See generally Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, CA. CODE ANN. §340.6, as recognized in Laird v. 
Blacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding one of the more egregious cases involving 
a lawyer who performed multiple roles, including serving as the business manager and financial 
advisor, for a client—in this case, the actress, Doris Day).    
21. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87. 
22. Id. 
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lawyer learns that the client was referred to the firm, the firm should thank the 
referring party.23   
Third, effective client screening at the intake stage involves some 
assessment of the client’s character traits.24  Lawyers may not want to 
represent difficult clients.  Difficult clients may be those who: (1) unduly 
criticize lawyers and the legal system; (2) insist on ethically questionable 
strategies;25 (3) possess unrealistic expectations about the success or value of 
a controversy;26 and (4) have terminated former counsel.27  Lawyers should 
learn the circumstances surrounding the termination or withdrawal of former 
counsel in hope of avoiding a similar fate.  On the other hand, the client’s 
willingness to honestly communicate and listen to the lawyer and consider his 
or her advice are important traits favoring the lawyer’s acceptance of 
employment.28  Clients need to understand that effective communication is a 
two-way street and that the client bears some of the responsibility for ensuring 
good communication.  A client should apprise the lawyer of any material 
changes in the client’s personal and professional life that may affect the 
representation—ranging from the client’s change of address to his or her 
discovery of relevant information or evidence.  The lawyer also should note 
any questions the lawyer has about the client’s personality that pose a risk to 
the firm and that warrant additional investigation.29 
23. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that “[m]any entertainment lawyers rely on 
referrals for their services from . . . previous clients, lawyers, agents, managers and personnel with 
entertainment companies” and cautioning lawyers not to provide compensation of any kind for the 
referral). 
24. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87-88. 
25. Id.  A good example of clients requesting lawyers to pursue a questionable ethical strategy 
involves an artist pressuring the lawyer who is negotiating a deal on his behalf to exaggerate the 
interest by competitors in acquiring the artist-client’s services in hope of starting a bidding war for the 
artist-client’s services.  Lawyers need to inform clients that although some commercial puffery is 
generally permitted, lawyers cannot make any misrepresentations during the deal negotiations.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 4.1(a) (2007) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
knowingly “mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third person”) and (b) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from knowingly “fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is 
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
rule 1.6”). 
26. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE LAWYER’S 
DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 56 (1999) [hereinafter ABA STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY]. 
27. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 89.   
28. Id. § 2.7, at 88; see also, NELSON, supra note 15, at 78-82.  Honest and full communication 
with the lawyer is promoted by educating the client about the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and 
the lawyer’s ethical obligation to protect information relating to representation.  It is important that 
the lawyer discuss these concepts and his or her limitations with the client as soon as possible.  
29. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88.  
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Fourth, the lawyer should consider the client’s financial background to 
determine the sources and level of financial support for the representation.  
Information concerning a client’s outstanding and potential debts as well as a 
list of the entertainment client’s assets may help the lawyer understand 
possible financial constraints to the representation.30   
Fifth, the lawyer should investigate whether the firm can competently 
represent the client.31  The firm may have to expend resources to develop or 
enhance its competency before undertaking representation—including the 
hiring of experienced lawyers or support staff, or attending a continuing 
education program in the field.32  Even after representation has begun, the law 
firm may need to enhance its competency.  For example, the law firms 
representing the music industry in the well-known copyright infringement 
case, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,33 added a team of partners and several 
associates—including the hiring of former United States Solicitor General Ken 
Starr as co-counsel—once the parties decided to seek Supreme Court 
ew.34   
Sixth, the lawyer needs to consider what, if any, possible ethical or 
business conflicts of interest might arise that could cause a loss of business to 
the firm.35  This consideration militates against a lawyer hastily accepting a 
new client or matter without adequate time to reflect upon possible conflicts, 
especially in the context of a large firm where the lawyer may need to consult 
with several colleagues.  The consultation may take several days and require
30. See id.; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that lawyers often represent 
entertainment clients on a contingency fee basis because of their clients’ limited financial resources). 
31. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88.  Model Rule 1.1’s competency standard 
requires lawyers who are also sports agents to be knowledgeable about sports.  See Konn, supra note 
6, at 15; see also David S. Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes: 
Agents, “Attorney-Agents,” Full-Service Agencies and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 31, 40-41 (2003); see generally David S. Caudill, Sports and Entertaiment Agents and 
Agent-Attorneys: Discourses and Conventions Concerning Crossing Jurisdictional and Professional 
Borders, 43 AKRON L REV. ___,  __(2010) (discussing competency and other ethical issues regarding 
non-attorney sports agents and attorney-sports agents involved in cross-border representation of 
atheletes).    
32. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3.  Lawyers should attend continuing legal education programs 
in the entertainment field to help ensure they provide competent representation.  Id. 
33. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
34. Susan Butler, Legal Matters: Supreme Team, BILLBOARD, July 9, 2005.  
35. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88.  For example, a lawyer who defends a record 
company regarding employment matters may not be precluded ethically from representing a plaintiff 
in a wrongful termination of employment action against another record company.  However, as a 
business matter, the lawyer’s current record company-client may not want the lawyer to represent the 
plaintiff against the second record company because the lawyer might establish precedent that could 
harm the current record company-client in some future employee dispute.  
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pt a “scorch and burn” 
strategy in litigation or engage in unethical behavior. 
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lawyer to send a firm-wide memo identifying the proposed employment.   
Lawyers should inform clients that their professional code of ethics may 
preclude them from accepting employment where a conflict of interest exists 
in certain circumstances.  This approach provides two benefits to lawyers: it 
gives the lawyer time to step back and reflect upon whether the lawyer should 
accept employment, and also underscores to the layperson that the
fessional services are governed by a code of professional norms.  
Finally, entertainment lawyers must remember that accepting client 
representation may be dangerous to their professional well-being.  Refusing an 
offer of employment may represent the best business and personal decision 
that a lawyer makes all year.  Even after accepting employment, lawyers still 
need to be prepared to say “no” to clients.  For example, a lawyer should reject 
a vindictive client’s insistence that the lawyer ado
III.  BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH CLIENTS 
Given the highly competitive and entrepreneurial nature of the 
entertainment business, it is not surprising that lawyers have opportunities to 
become involved with their clients’ businesses.36  Significant risk often 
accompanies a lawyer’s decision to enter into business transactions with a 
client.  A disgruntled client-partner may be likely to file a grievance with the 
bar’s disciplinary authority or institute a malpractice action against the 
lawyer.37  A lawyer may be subject to third-party suits, such as those filed by 
investors in the business who feel harmed by the lawyer’s actions.  A business 
venture with a client may also create conflicts of interest with the lawyer’s
rent or future clients that could result in a loss of business for the lawyer.   
The first step to avoiding the problems intrinsic to lawyer-client business 
transactions is to be sure to recognize them.  There are generally two types of 
36. See Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics, in ENTERTAINMENT, 
PU H
’L 
CO
BLIS ING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 149-50 (R. Thorne ed. 2004-05).   
37. See generally e.g., In re Stover, 104 P.3d 394 (Kan. 2005).  In Stover, the attorney was 
disbarred in part for acquiring an ownership interest that was adverse to her client.  Attorney Kathy 
Stover offered to serve as a business manager and attorney for Michael Jahnz, a musician.  Stover 
created websites that used Jahnz’s name and likeness without obtaining Jahnz’s written permission.  
Stover refused to remove the websites after Jahnz terminated Stover’s representation.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court held that Stover had “acquired an interest adverse to the Jahnzes by creating websites 
that used Michael’s name and likeness without his written permission” and that this violated Rule 
1.8(a) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC).  Id. at 838.  The rule prohibits a lawyer 
from “knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to 
the client unless . . . the client consents in writing thereto.”  Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROF
NDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.8(a) (providing ethical standards the equivalent of KRPC 1.8). 
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to procure such advice. 41  Third, the lawyer must procure the client’s written 
lawyer-client business transactions.38  The first type stems from the subject 
matter of the lawyer’s representation for the client, such as when a music 
lawyer and his or her artist-client each contribute fifty percent of the start up 
capital for a recording company.  The second type of lawyer-client business 
transaction may be entirely unrelated to the subject matter of the 
representation—for example, when a music-lawyer who represents his or her 
artist-client only in entertainment matters becomes a partner with the client in 
a real estate venture. 39  Both types of client-business transactions raise 
important questions about the lawyer’s loyalty to the client and are governed 
by each state’s lawyer code of conduct.  The fear is that the lawyer’s self-
interest in the joint business enterprise with the client will undermine 
yer’s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client.   
Model Rule 1.8(a) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct lists specific requirements a lawyer-client business 
transaction must meet to avoid an ethical violation.40  First, the lawyer must 
ensure that the transaction and terms are fair and reasonable to the client and 
are fully disclosed in writing in a manner understood by the client.  Second, 
the lawyer must inform the client in writing about seeking independent advice 
regarding the transaction and provide the client with a reasonable opportunity 
 
38. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
58 (identifying several forms of “Inappropriate Involvement in Client Interests,” such as “[a]cting as a 
director or officer of a client company[,] [i]nvesting in client securities[,] [b]ecoming involved in one-
to- b
 of the 
rep n
feres with the 
law
one usiness deals with a client[,] [a]ccepting stock from a client in lieu of a cash fee[,] [a]greeing 
to contingent cash fees[,][and] [s]oliciting other investors on behalf of a client’s enterprise”).  Id.  
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, AT R. 1.8(a) cmt. 1.  Comment 1 
provides another example of a client-lawyer business transaction unrelated to the subject matter
rese tation: a lawyer, preparing a will for a client, learns that the client needs money for a matter 
unrelated to the subject of the representation, and the lawyer loans the money to the client.  Id. 
40. Although not completely coextensive, DR 5-104(A) is the Code’s counterpart to Rule 1.8(a).  
DR 5-104 (A) provides:  “A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they 
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional 
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.”  
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 5-104(A); see id. at EC 5-3 
(cautioning lawyers from accepting or continuing employment when some interest inter
yer’s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of his client); see also id. at EC 5-5 
(noting that lawyers should not suggest to the client that he make a gift to the lawyer).   
41. See generally Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).  In Croce, the widow of 
the late songwriter and singer, Jim Croce, sought damages from several defendants, including Kurnit, 
who was an entertainment lawyer.  Kurnit was introduced to the Croces by the other defendants as 
“the lawyer.”  Id. at 887, 889.  Kurnit outlined the terms of the recording, publishing, and 
management contracts that were executed by the Croces.  Id.  The parties never negotiated the terms 
of the contracts.  Id. at 887.  Kurnit was a shareholder and participant in the management and 
publishing businesses that signed the Croces.  Id.  Although the court found that the Croces were not 
Kurnit’s clients, it held that they reasonably relied on Kurnit’s explanation of the “legal 
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and informed consent, signed by the client, to all the essential terms of the 
agreement, including the lawyer’s role in the transaction and whether the 
lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.42  The lawyer may need to 
seek additional informed consent waivers regarding the same transaction if 
new circumstances create conflicts of interest unknown to the client when he 
last consented to the lawyer’s involvement.  Even if a lawyer-client business 
transaction is not a “per se” violation of the ethical rules, ethical and unethical 
behavior is a thin line that the lawyer may cross inadvertently.43  The lawyer 
who engages in a lawyer-client business transaction that complies with the 
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) still must ensure that he or she maintains 
“independent professional judgment” as required under Model Rule 2.1, and 
avoid any conflicts of interest between the lawyer and client.44 
Lawyers and their firms need to remember that developing a good 
professional relationship with a client requires work.45  The maintenance of 
that relationship becomes even more challenging when it also becomes a 
business relationship.46  Before a lawyer agrees to enter into a business 
transaction with a client, a comprehensive client and subject matter-screening 
process is key.47  Every business transaction with a client contains some risk, 
 
ramifications” of the contracts.  Id. at 890.  This explanation together with his introduction as “the 
lawyer,” his interest as a principal in the transactions, “the Croces lack of independent 
representation,” and the failure of the Croces to have independent counsel, created a fiduciary duty 
between the Croces and Kurnit.  Id.  This duty required Kurnit to act fairly and to advise the Croces to 
obtain independent advice about the contracts with the defendants.  Id. at 893-94.  However, Kurnit 
never advised the Croces to seek independent counsel.  Id.  As a result, the court ruled that Kurnit 
breached his fiduciary duty to the Croces and was liable for their legal fees.  Id.; see also, Abdo & 
Sahl, supra note 1, at 5 n.30 (explaining that Croce inspired entertainment lawyers to include an 
acknowledgement provision in contracts that the artist was advised to seek independent counsel). 
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.8(a) cmt. 3 (reporting, in 
part, that “[t]he risk to the client is [the] greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the 
client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk 
that the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s financial 
interest in the transaction,” and noting that Model Rule 1.7 may preclude the lawyer from “seeking 
the client’s consent to the transaction”).     
43. Jodi Brandenburg & David Coher, Going for the Gold: Equity Stakes in Corporate Clients, 
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1179, 1193 (2001). 
44. Id.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 & 6 
(emphasizing that “independent judgment [is] [an] essential element[ ] in the lawyer’s relationship to 
a client;” noting that the “lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on 
representation of a client;” and warning that “[i]f the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a 
transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult if not impossible for the lawyer to give the client 
detached advice”). 
45. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
186. 
46. Id. 
47. See supra, Part I. 
SAHL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2010  2:07 PM 
388 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 20:2 
ion with a client 
to p
law
 
but the lawyer can better assess the magnitude of the risk by thoroughly 
screening the client and matter beforehand.48  If a lawyer accepts the risk and 
becomes his or her client’s business partner, the lawyer’s firm should take 
steps to protect itself.  A firm should require an attorney who wants to engage 
in a business transaction with a client to discuss the situation with a partner in 
the firm.49  Even in a sole-proprietorship situation, the lawyer should consult 
an independent attorney before entering into a business transaction with a 
client.50  Firms should make sure that the business transaction between the 
attorney and the client is clearly and fully memorialized in writing, such as in 
the engagement letter or in a separate document.  Additionally, a firm should 
not allow the attorney who is entering into a business transact
rovide legal advice regarding the business transaction.51   
Lawyers may become the subject of third-party claims when they become 
involved with the business activities of their clients.  When clients’ business 
activities fail, investors and others who have experienced financial loss may 
look to the lawyer for compensation.52  When a lawyer is involved in business 
transactions with the client, outsiders do not perceive the lawyer as 
independent from the client, but rather view the lawyer as having great power 
and influence over the client.53  This perception has caused malpractice 
insurance carriers to exclude from professional-liability coverage those 
yers who are directors and officers of their clients’ business enterprises.54   
Difficulties also arise when lawyers forego a cash fee and instead acquire 
an interest in clients’ businesses.55  The difficulties include speculation as to 
possible undue influence by the lawyer in obtaining stock or other interests 
48. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 95.   
49. Id.  
50. Id.   
51. Id. (recommending that if the lawyer in the transaction provides legal advice, it should be 
“reviewed and approved in advance by a disinterested partner in the firm”). 
52. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
189. 
53. Id. at 180.  See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that, due to the merging 
roles of lawyer, manager, and agent, entertainment lawyers “intentionally or inadvertently exercise a 
greater degree of control over the client than is customary in other law practices”).  
54. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
182; see also JAY G. FOONBERG, HOW TO START & BUILD A LAW PRACTICE 471-72 (2d ed. 1999).   
55. See generally Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43.  In an effort to obtain higher profits, 
lawyers have begun investing in the initial public offerings of clients.  Id. at 1179.  Although 
receiving an equity stake in a client is not new, the vast amount of potential profits for lawyers is new.  
Id. at 1179-80; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that a lawyer may accept an 
ownership interest in literary property when representing a client in transactions related to the 
property). 
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vation that “[t]he more ties 
you have, the more questions people may raise.”58 
d be 
sensitive to third-party liability when signing an engagement letter with a 
client.61 
instead of a fee, the reasonable amount the lawyer should pay for the interest, 
the lack of independence a lawyer has once the lawyer gains an equity interest 
in the client, and other conflict of interest concerns, such as whether the 
lawyer must withdraw from representation.56  Generally, once the lawyer 
owns an interest in the client’s business, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
the lawyer to maintain independent judgment because of the lawyer’s financial 
interest.57  This belief stems in part from the obser
IV.  SCOPE OF RETENTION 
Lawyers can minimize the risk of a malpractice claim by ensuring that 
clients understand the scope of representation.  Lawyers must orally explain 
the nature and terms of the professional relationship in a manner readily 
understood by their clients.  Lawyers should also have a written engagement 
letter to help ensure that both the lawyer and the client clearly understand the 
purpose, nature, and scope of the lawyer’s and client’s responsibilities.59  The 
engagement letter should clearly identify the client, including the client’s 
proper legal name when the client is a business.60  Lawyers shoul
 
56. Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43, at 1181 (citing Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36 (2000)). 
57. Id. at 1189.  The article suggests that although lawyers should instruct clients to seek outside 
counsel before issuing the stock to the lawyer, this suggestion is often unrealistic because a client 
off
to discuss all of the contents of an engagement letter, a 
law sion that describes the grounds and process for 
the y
ering an equity share in itself probably lacks the money to hire another lawyer to review the deal.  
Id. at 1183. 
58. Id. at 1182 (quoting John F. Olson, chair of the ABA Business Law Section’s Committee on 
Lawyer Business Ethics).   
59. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 96.  See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3-4.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this article 
yer should include in any engagement letter a provi
 law er’s withdrawal from representation. 
60. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 98. 
61. See generally Even Street Prods. v. Shkat Arrow Hafer & Weber, LLP, No.643 F.Supp. 2d 
317 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (the spelling of the law firm’s name in the case heading of the reported decision 
differs from the spelling in the text of the opinion).  In 2000, New York Times Television and 
Diamond Time Ltd., produced a documentary about Sly Stone titled “Jimi and Sly: The Skin I’m In.”  
Id. at 320.  That same year Showtime Networks broadcasted the documentary.  The production used 
Sly Stone’s music without authorization of the copyright holders, Sony and Warner/Chappell 
(Warner).  Id.  Sony and Warner retained Shukat, Arrow, Hafer & Webber, LLP (Shukat) to prosecute 
a copyright infringement action.  The Shukat firm entered into a written agreement with the New 
York Times Television attorneys to toll the statute of limitations in hope of reaching a settlement.  Id.  
That agreement expired and Sony and Warner were barred from suing for copyright infringement.  
Sony and Warner assigned to the plaintiff, Even Street Productions (Even), all of the rights and 
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The engagement letter should state clearly the basis and amount of the 
lawyer’s fee.62  The letter also should address other financial issues, including 
the advancement of expenses, the computation of interest on outstanding 
balances, special firm charges (e.g. copying and delivery of documents), and 
billing procedures.63  The engagement letter also should identify the client’s 
interests of Sly Stone’s musical career.  Id. at 319-20.  Even expected to benefit from a resolution of 
the copyright infringement claims, which Sony and Warner could no longer bring because they were 
barred by the statute of limitations.  Even also had separate agreements with Sony and Warner that 
assigned and transferred any and all claims or causes of action Sony and Warner had against any third 
party.  Even sued Shukat for legal malpractice.  The court denied the law firm’s motion to dismiss and 
held that Even could sue Shukat for legal malpractice.  The court determined that Even’s agreements 
with Sony and Warner could be reasonably construed as assigning not only copyright claims but also 
legal malpractice claims.  See also Phillip M. Callesen & James W. May, Potential Legal Opinion 
Liability for Ohio Business Lawyers, 23 THE OHIO LAWYER 13, 15 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (discussing 
liability for lawyers who provide opinions to clients that are relied on by third parties, and reviewing 
Dean Foods v. Arthur J. Pappathanasi, 18 Mass. L. Rep. 598 (2004), a case that resulted in a $7.2 
mi  
gly and voluntarily 
aff  
claimed to have fathered Anna Nicole Smith’s 
llion judgment against a seller’s law firm for negligent misrepresentation in issuing a legal opinion 
for the sale of a business).  Id. 
62. See generally King v. Fox, 418 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005), for a recent entertainment law case 
involving a dispute over a fee agreement.  Edward King was a member of the Southern rock band, 
Lynyrd Skynyrd, from 1972 to 1975.  Id. at 124.  After MCA Records and the band refused to pay 
King his artist royalties, King hired attorney Lawrence Fox.  Id. at 124-25.  Due to King’s limited 
resources, Fox—who specialized in personal injury cases—agreed to represent King on a contingency 
fee basis.  Id.  The brief, written agreement stated that Fox was entitled to one-third of “any money 
recovered from” MCA Records.  Id. at 125.  On King’s behalf, Fox secured a settlement with MCA 
Records related only to King’s artist royalties.  Fox then relied on the written contingency fee 
agreement to obtain one-third of King’s writer royalties as well as his artist royalties—even though 
Fox never represented King in writer royalty matters.  Id. at 126.  King sued Fox for malpractice, 
alleging in part that the terms of the contingency fee agreement were unconscionable.  The federal 
district court granted summary judgment to Fox, finding that the terms were within a reasonable 
range, that Fox clearly explained the terms of the agreement to King, and that King ratified Fox’s 
conduct.  King v. Fox, No. 917 CIV 4134, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 462, at **12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 
2004).  On appeal, the Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals on 
the issue of whether King ratified Fox’s potentially unconscionable conduct.  King, 418 F.3d at 137.  
The New York Court of Appeals answered all three questions affirmatively but with significant 
qualifications.  King v. Fox, 51 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2006).  First, the court held that a ratification of 
an attorney’s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous representation “so long as the 
client has full knowledge of the relevant facts and has acquiesced.”  Id. at 1191.  Second, the court 
held that a ratification of an attorney’s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous 
representation even if attorney misconduct occurs during that period so long as the client’s 
acquiescence is not obtained as a result of the misconduct.  Id.  Third, the court held that a ratification 
of an attorney’s fee agreement that might otherwise be considered voidable as unconscionable can 
occur if the client is fully informed, has equal bargaining power, and knowin
irms an existing fee arrangement with “both a full understanding of the facts that made the 
agreement voidable and knowledge of his or her rights as a client.”  Id. at 1192.   
63. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 101-02; see also ABA CENTER FOR PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 61-75 (5th ed. 2003).  See 
generally  Rachel Abramowitz, Birkhead Gets Tentative Ruling Against Ex-Attorney, L.A. TIMES, 
July 13, 2007, at E2 (discussing, in part, the misunderstandings and fee dispute between Attorney 
Debra Opri and her former client, Larry Birkhead, who 
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responsibilities, such as notifying the lawyer of any material changes that may 
affect the lawyer’s work.64  In multiple-client settings, lawyers should at a 
minimum inform all clients in writing about the effect of joint representation 
on the attorney-client privilege.65  In addition to a written document outlining 
the rights and responsibilities of both the lawyer and the client, the lawyer 
should discuss these matters with the client to ensure that the client truly 
understands the representation agreement.66   
The engagement letter also should clearly state the scope of the lawyer’s 
authority.  Under Model Rule 1.2, the client has authority to settle a case.67  
The engagement letter should expressly identify to what extent, if any, the 
daughter; Birkhead sued Opri for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice).  The California 
Ba
0 million in 
dam
nal services,” but noting that lawyers may withdraw pursuant to DR 2-110) (emphasis 
added). 
r Association also investigated Opri’s conduct.  Id.  
64. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.   
65. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 99.  The representation of multiple clients also 
presents conflict of interest issues.  See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that some 
commentators believe that lawyers should refuse to simultaneously represent an artist and a manager 
in negotiating their artist-management agreement because of conflict of interest concerns) (citing Jack 
P. Sahl, Professor of Law and Faculty Dir. of the Miller-Becker Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility at the 
Univ. of Akron School of Law, Presentation at the 12th Annual International Folk Alliance 
Conference: Ethics for Entertainment Lawyers: Avoiding Conflicts of Interest (Feb. 11, 2000).  See 
Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 798 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. 2004), for an example of a client feeling 
betrayed in the context of multiple representation,.  The plaintiff, the singer Michael Bolton, sued his 
lawyers, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges (WGM) for breaching its fiduciary duties in representing him in a 
copyright action brought by Three Brothers Action.  Id.  Bolton contended that WGM failed (1) to 
advise him of conflicts of interests arising from WGM’s joint representation of Bolton, his record 
company (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.), and his publishing company (Warner-Chappell Ltd.), and 
(2) to advise him of settlement developments or follow his instructions regarding settlement.  Id. at 
345.  Bolton argued that WGM did not discuss with him his indemnity obligations to his publishing 
and record companies and did not inform him of favorable settlement offers.  Id. at 2-3.; see generally 
Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) 
(denying a motion by Bolton’s former personal lawyers, Epstein, Levinsohn, Bodine, Hurwitz & 
Weinstein, to dismiss a third-party complaint against them, and permitting a claim for contribution 
against them by WGM); Anthony Lin, Singer Sues Weil, Gotshal & Manges Over Joint 
Representation, 230 N.Y. L. J. 1, Dec. 22, 2003 (reporting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a jury award of $5.4 million against Bolton, his co-writer, music publisher and 
record company for copyright infringement, and noting that Bolton sued WGM for $3
ages alleging that the firm “was conflicted” when it defended him and other parties). 
66. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54. 
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2.  The Code counterpart to Rule 
1.2 is EC 7-7 (emphasizing that the ultimate authority to accept a settlement rests with the client).  See 
also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 7-8 (explaining that a lawyer 
should ensure that the client makes informed decisions, and should defer to the client when the client 
decides “to forego legally available objectives”).  See generally id. at DR 7-101(A)(1) (providing that 
a lawyer must not intentionally fail to seek the client’s lawful objectives); Id. at DR 7-101(A)(2) 
(stating that lawyers must “not fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for 
professio
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he 
sett
them.73  A clear understanding of the client’s expectations at the start of the 
client delegates settlement authority to the lawyer.68  A lawyer should be 
aware that even if there is an agreement granting the lawyer authority to 
engage in settlement discussions with the other side, this does not mean that 
the lawyer has authority to actually accept or reject settlement offers.69  If the 
lawyer wants specific settlement authority, the lawyer should discuss the 
matter with the client and obtain written authorization.70  Even if the client 
grants specific settlement authority, it is generally wise to communicate t
lement offer to the client prior to the lawyer accepting or rejecting it.71   
The engagement letter needs to describe the goals of representation—
particularly in an entertainment law practice, where the lawyer often performs 
different roles.72  It is important that the entertainment lawyer listen to the 
client’s wishes in establishing the goals of representation.  If the representation 
involves litigation, the client may want to settle a case early or may want to 
explore alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration or mediation.  The lawyer 
should have a clear understanding of the client’s objectives at the beginning of 
representation so that he or she can devise and implement a plan to achieve 
 
68. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 99.  The lawyer’s settlement authority must be 
specific.  Id.  Even if a client grants a lawyer settlement authority in an engagement letter, the lawyer 
should be mindful that subsequent client instructions can override this authority.  Id.  (citing Lewis v. 
Uselton, 416 S.E.2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1992) (holding that although an engagement letter granted the lawyer 
“fu
 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[t]he authority 
to 
IBILITY, supra note 14, 
 D
ttlement, so that the client can make a fully-informed decision about 
set e ing a decision should avoid interference with the 
cli
ffective Negotiations, 7 PEPP. DISP. 
ll ‘power and authority to settle,’” the lawyer’s acceptance of a $22,500 settlement offer was 
unauthorized when the clients told the attorney they did not want to settle for anything under 
$50,000)). 
69. Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230
negotiate . . . is far different from the authority to agree to a specific settlement.”); Johnson v. 
Schmitz, 237 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192 (Dist. Conn. 2002) (stating that authority to enter into negotiations 
is not the same as authority to agree to a settlement).     
70.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.4 cmt. 2.  “A lawyer who 
receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea 
bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has 
previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer 
to accept or reject an offer.”  See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONS
at R 5-106.  Although there is no direct counterpart in the Code to Rule 1.4, DR 5-106 suggests that 
a lawyer should not make an aggregate settlement on behalf of multiple clients unless each client has 
consented to the settlement after being fully advised of important details.  Id.  
 71.  “A lawyer should provide a client with a professional assessment of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a proposed se
tlem nt.  Any effort to assist the client in reach
ent’s ultimate decision-making authority.”  ABA ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT 
NEGOTIATIONS, 3.2.4 (2002). 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
73. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.  
The attorney must consult with his or her client to clearly determine “the client’s desired results.”  See 
Renee A. Pistone, Case Studies: The Ways to Achieve More E
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attorney-client relationship also permits the lawyer to address any 
unreasonable expectations.  
A lawyer’s representation of a client generally includes “(1) gathering 
facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4) 
researching the law, (5) drafting correspondence and documents, (6) 
negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court.”74  However, the lawyer 
and client may agree to limit the representation by excluding some of the 
services that lawyers generally provide.75  For example, a lawyer may agree to 
negotiate a publishing contract for an author but decline to shop the author’s 
work to other publishing companies, review the work for possible defamation, 
or counsel the client regarding the tax consequences of forming a corporation.  
A client might prefer limited representation because the client has limited 
objectives or cannot afford all of the services generally included in full 
representation.76   
Before a lawyer agrees to limit the scope of the representation, the lawyer 
needs to confirm that limiting the scope is reasonable under the 
circumstances.77  To determine whether limiting the scope is reasonable, the 
lawyer should evaluate: the complexity of the case, transaction, or other 
matter; the importance of the matter; the judge or jury’s discretion in 
reviewing the matter; how the dispute will be resolved; and other resources the 
client might have to aid in representation.78   
Clients who agree to limited representation tend to be happy with the 
results, as evidenced in part by the low rate of malpractice claims against 
limited-assistance attorneys.79  This may be because limited representation is 
RESOL. L. J. 425, 445 (2007).  In choosing which strategy to employ the attorney needs to consider 
wh
HEY III ET AL., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 2 n.6 
(20  Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 
421 .   
rovide more legal services in the case of a divorce involving 
cus
 rather than more malpractice claims when lawyers 
at [his or] her client’s hopes and fears are.”  Id. at 459.  The attorney must conduct negotiations in 
the way that comports with the client’s desired ends.  Id. at 445. 
74. MARK H. TOU
02) (quoting Forrest S.
, 422-23 (1994))
75. Id. at 2. 
76. Id. at 2-7.  
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2 cmt. 7.   
78. TOUHEY III,  supra note 73, at 59.  “[T]he best candidates for limited scope assistance have a 
degree of emotional detachment, the willingness and ability to handle ‘some paperwork,’ some 
capacity to gather and analyze financial information, reasonable decisiveness, willingness and ability 
to handle details and follow through on obligations, and the necessary time to perform delegated 
tasks.”  Id. (citing M. SUE TALIA, A CLIENT’S GUIDE TO LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES xiii (1997)).  As 
the complexity of the issues increase, so does the need for lawyer support and advice.  Id. at 59.  For 
example, the lawyer would need to p
tody disputes and division of pension plans than in an uncontested divorce where no children or 
significant property is involved.  Id.  
79. See id. at 51.  “[T]here are fewer
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more client-centered than full representation.80  Limited representation often 
provides the client with a high degree of control over his or her legal affairs 
and offers a more affordable price than with full representation where the 
client is expected to surrender his money and control to the lawyer—giving 
him or her “all [of] the responsibility.”81  It is important to remember, 
however, that the decision to limit the scope of representation does not excuse 
the lawyer’s obligation to provide competent representation.82   
V.  TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
Lawyer codes of conduct provide different conflict of interest rules 
depending on whether the lawyer is representing a current client against 
another current client, or instead, a current client against a former client.83  
Thus, the point in time at which a person is no longer a current client has 
major consequences for the lawyer.  Consequently, in both current and former 
client situations, lawyers need to understand the timing aspects of the attorney-
client relationship.   
Model Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts between current clients.  As a general 
rule, a lawyer cannot represent a client if the representation will be “directly 
adverse to another client” or if the representation would “materially limit” the 
lawyer’s representation of another client.84  However, under Model Rule 1.7 
unb
on” as one where the 
law
 MICHAEL A. CANE, WELCOME TO THE 
INF
g that although clients may seek limited representation for 
var
 relationship” test as first formulated 
by  
undled services.”  Id. (quoting Leigh P. Perkins, Unbundling Your Services Makes Some Clients 
Happy, LAWS. WKLY USA, Dec. 18, 1995).   
80. See NELSON, supra note 15, at 27-40.  As purveyors of services, lawyers must be “client-
centered as well as case-oriented” and also describing a “client-centered orientati
yers “gather as much information as [they] can about how [their] clients see their situations, and 
factoring that information into the solutions [they] design for them.”  Id. at 27.   
81. TOUHEY III, supra note 73, at 52 (citing
ORMATION HIGHWAY, in THE CHANGING FACE OF LEGAL PRACTICE: A NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON “UNBUNDLED” LEGAL SERVICES 2 (Vol. 4 2000).   
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2 cmt. 7.  See also Fred C. 
Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 915, 915-16 (1998) (notin
ious reasons, “legal ethics norms expect lawyers to maximize their clients’ positions, regardless of 
whether the clients pay them to do so”).   
83.  The Code’s conflict of interest provisions are found at DR 5-101 and DR 5-105.  Unlike the 
Model Rules, the Code does not have a provision expressly dealing with conflicts involving former 
clients.  Code jurisdictions nevertheless followed the “substantial
 the courts for resolving conflicts involving former clients.  See infra notes 90-93 and 
accompanying text (discussing the substantial relationship test). 
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(a) (1)–(2) cf. MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPSONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 5-15 (exhorting that “a lawyer should never represent 
in litigation multiple clients with differing interest” but noting that a lawyer may represent multiple 
clients in non-litigation matters only if their interests vary slightly); Id. at DR 5-105(B) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from “represent[ing] multiple clients if doing so will adversely affect the representation”).  It 
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(b)(1)-(4), even if a conflict exists with another current client, the lawyer can 
still represent a client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able 
to provide competent and diligent representation to each 
affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim 
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer 
in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; 
and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing.85   
Even after following the steps in Model Rule 1.7 (b)(1)-(4), a lawyer 
should be wary about representing current clients with adverse interests.  For 
example, even if the lawyer can show the representation was not prohibited by 
law, that it did not involve a claim brought by one client against another client 
in the same proceeding, and that each client gave informed consent in writing, 
the lawyer still has to prove that he reasonably believed he could provide 
 
is worth noting that conflicts of interest are common in the entertainment industry.  At least one well-
know entertainment lawyer has gone so far as to suggest that, “[a]nyone that does not have conflicts is 
not a player in Hollywood.”  Adam Sandler, Legal Eagles Swoop Down on Hollywood Suit: Conflict 
of Interest: Latest Legal Scuffle, VARIETY, Aug. 28, 1995.  The New York Times reported that the 
prominent entertainment lawyer, Bert Fields, “has drawn some heat in Hollywood for simultaneously 
representing both talent and studios.”  See Allison Hope Weiner, Telling Hollywood It’s Out of Order, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at I7.  Fields said that after he discloses the conflict to his clients, “[t]hey 
usually think it’s a great advantage.”  See id.; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that 
sometimes the “package deal”—where a lawyer simultaneously represents a successful movie 
producer and a famous actor—may result in a lucrative production in which “[e]veryone wins”). 
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4) cf. CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 5-105(C) (stating that in situations covered in DR 5-105 (A) (a 
lawyer shall not accept proffered employment if his independent judgment is likely to be adversely 
affected) and (B) (a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if his independent judgment on 
behalf of one client is adversely affected by representation of another client), a lawyer “may represent 
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each” and each 
consents after full disclosure to the representation).  See generally id. at EC 5-17 (providing that 
before a lawyer represents multiple clients in a non-litigation matter, the lawyer “should explain fully 
to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue 
employment only if the clients consent”).  The Model Rules make it clear now that the lawyer may 
not “represent both Client A and B in the case of A v. B.”  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. 
DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 280-
81 (2005).  It is also clear “that Rule 1.7 does not absolutely prohibit a lawyer from representing 
adverse parties outside of the litigation context . . . if the lawyer secures an adequate waiver.”  Id. at 
282.    
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because of the fear that the lawyer failed to zealously 
purs
competent and diligent representation to each client.  If lawyers are not 
careful, they may find themselves in the middle of a disqualification 
proceeding.86 In many cases, the lawyer’s belief that such competent and 
diligent representation was possible will not be reasonable by the very fact that 
the lawyer is representing one client against another.87  When representing 
two clients against each other, there is a substantial risk that one or both will 
feel betrayed, in part, 
ue a client’s interests.88   
When a current client no longer employs a lawyer, the client becomes a 
former client.  The timing of when a current client becomes a former client is 
not always clear.  Nevertheless, a lawyer owes former clients certain ethical 
duties.  Model Rule 1.9 identifies these obligations and provides that a lawyer 
cannot represent a client against a former client in “the same or a substantially 
related matter” when the client’s interests are “materially adverse to the 
interests of the former client,” unless the former client gives informed written 
consent.89  When a new matter is the same or substantially similar, it is 
generally assumed that the lawyer gained confidences relevant to the new 
 
 86.  See Mary Flood, Hardin Stays as Clemens’ Attorney/Judge Says Issue of Representation 
Excludes McNamee, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 2008 at 5.  In the instant case, the judge ultimately 
allowed Attorney Rusty Hardin to continue to represent Roger Clemens in his defamation suit against 
Brian McNamee. Id.  McNamee lacked standing to seek Hardin’s disqualification because he had 
represented Andy Pettitte, not McNamee.  Pettitte was Clemens’ former teammate and a potential 
defense witness in the same defamation case.  Id.  “Richard Emery, one of McNamee’s New York 
City-based lawyers, said . . . the judge acknowledged that Hardin [did] something unethical because 
the r at.”  Id. 
ny “circumstance that might cause multiple 
clie t
  Such conduct by sports lawyer-agents would violate Model 
Ru
 cou t implied that if Pettitte asks to have Hardin removed, the judge may do th
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(b)(1).  
88. See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6 cf.  CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 5-16 
(providing that a lawyer should advise multiple clients of a
nts o question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer”).  
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.9(a) cf. CODE OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT EC 4-6 (requiring a lawyer to preserve the confidences of a client after the termination of 
employment).  This obligation generally precludes a lawyer from representing an interest adverse to 
that of a former client in a substantially related matter.  See Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 5.  In the case of Fargnoli v. Ziffren, 
Brittenham & Branca, Fargnoli, Case No BC068280 (1992 L.A. Sup. Ct.,—a former manager for 
Prince—was previously represented by the defendant law firm.  Alex Citron & Robert W. Welkos, 
Hollywood Firm Sued Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at D1.  The law firm later represented 
Prince when Fargnoli sued the entertainer.  Id.  Fargnoli alleged that the firm had disclosed 
confidential communications to Prince.  Id.  The court granted summary judgment to the law firm, 
noting that a written release precluded Fargnoli’s conflict of interest claims.  See James Bates, Judge 
Dismisses Suit by Prince’s Ex-Manager, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at D2.  For example, a sports 
agent representing two players on the same team in a sport where there are salary caps will have to 
sacrifice the interests of one client for the other in most cases, as players are “competing for a finite 
resource.”  Neiman supra note 6 at 15.
le 1.7’s conflict of interest standard. 
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 former representation against the former client 
unl
desire for clients to hire the lawyer of their own choosing.92  In 2009, the 
matter.90  Additionally, even if the lawyer is representing a client against a 
former client in a matter that is not substantially similar, the lawyer cannot use 
information gained during the
ess the client consents.91   
Although Model Rule 1.9 limits a lawyer’s ability to represent a current 
client against a former client, Model Rule 1.9 is not as restrictive as Model 
Rule 1.7.  Model Rule 1.9’s substantial relationship test reflects a concern for 
protecting clients’ loyalties and confidences, but it also reflects other 
competing policy concerns.  Those concerns include lawyer mobility and the 
 
90. See Donald R. McMinn, Note: ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased 
Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1231, 1250 (1990); 
see also Spivey, 601 N.E.2d at 59 (explaining that when the lawyer represents a client whose interests 
are adverse to that of a former client, there is a concern that the lawyer obtained confidential 
information during the representation (citing Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980)).  
Some courts take the position that where no confidential information was revealed during the former 
representation,
Westingho
he two matters but instead involves a realistic appraisal of the 
tantial 
relationship tes
representa ). 
r of the prior 
representation.  The Court has held that the former client’s failure to disclose confidential 
inform on to his at orney d s not disa
MODEL CODE OF 
PR
 there is no conflict of interest barring representation of a new client.  See generally 
use Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). 
The determination of whether there is a substantial relationship turns on the possibility, or 
appearance thereof, that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in 
relation to the subsequent matter in which disqualification is sought.  The rule thus does 
not necessarily involve any inquiry into the imponderables involved in the degree of 
relationship between t
possibility that confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be harmful to 
the client in the other. 
Id. at 224.  But see Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997) (finding that the subs
t should apply even if no confidential information is acquired during the course of 
tion).  Accord E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 397 (S.D. Tex. 1969
The rule against representing conflicting interests disqualifies an attorney from appearing 
adversely to his former client in litigation growing out of the subject matte
ati t oe ble him from moving to disqualify. 
Id.   
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.9 (C)(1) cf. 
OF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 4-5 (barring a lawyer from “us[ing] information 
acquired during the representation of a client to the disadvantage of that client”). 
92. McMinn, supra note 87, at 1250.  See generally e.g., Forbes v. NAMS International Inc., No. 
3:07-CV-0039, Slip 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45161 (N.D.N.Y 2007).  The defendant, NAMS 
International, developed patented software for multimedia entertainment.  Forbes and other plaintiffs 
invested in NAMS allegedly based on material misrepresentations concerning its capabilities and 
ability to obtain patent rights in new technologies in the field.  Id. at 5.  Attorney Ronald J. Benjamin 
represented the plaintiffs.  He also represented the defendant, NAMS, in its earlier lawsuit against 
Spectra.Net Communications after a proposed merger of the two companies failed.  During the 
merger negotiations, NAMS shared information concerning its current and future technology.  The 
district court found that even though eight years had passed, there was a substantial relationship 
between the issues raised in both cases and a high probability that Benjamin had access to 
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atter.95 
ABA amended Model Rule 1.10 that provides for imputed disqualification to 
further promote lawyer mobility and client choice of counsel.93  When a 
lawyer departs one firm for another, Model Rule 1.10 now permits the 
departing lawyer’s new firm to avoid having the migratory lawyer’s conflicts 
imputed to it by erecting a screen around the new lawyer.94  The screen should 
be in place when the migratory lawyer joins the new firm to protect against the 
lawyer’s involvement in the conflicted m
In deciding whether Model Rule 1.7 or 1.9 is applicable for analyzing a 
conflict of interest problem, the lawyer must ascertain whether the client is 
proceeding against another current or former client of the lawyer.  Timing is 
important.  At what point does a current client become a former client for 
purposes of a conflict of interest analysis?   
Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.3 provides that, unless representation is 
terminated under Model Rule 1.16, a lawyer should “carry through to 
conclusion” all the matters undertaken for the client.96  If the lawyer’s 
representation has been limited to a specific matter, the attorney-client 
relationship ends when the attorney completes that specific matter.97  
 
confidential information about NAMS that would be harmful to it in the instant case.  Id. at 13-15.  
The court granted NAMS’ disqualification motion against Benjamin and stated that the need to 
preserve the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial process overrides the plaintiffs’ choice 
of legal representation in this case.  Id. at 15; see genearlly Disqualification Motion, 23 ENT. L. & 
FIN. 4 (Sept. 2007) (discussing the holding in Forbes, No. 3:07-CV-0039, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45161). 
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.10.  See 25, NO. 16 ABA/BNA 
LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 420 (Aug. 5, 2009) (commenting that the “[r]ules for the first time 
provide that private law firms may screen incoming lawyers to avoid the imputation of the lawyer’s 
former-client conflicts to the rest of the firm, even without getting consent from the affected former 
clients” and noting that if “certain procedural requirements are met, a screened lawyer’s colleagues 
may represent clients in matters that the lawyer would be prohibited from handling under the rule on 
former client conflicts”). 
94. See 25, NO 16. ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 418 (Aug. 5, 2009) (recognizing that 
the ABA approved a modest “‘housekeeping amendment’ to Model Rule 1.10” that clarifies that the 
new non-consensual screening procedures in the rule may be used to prevent a firm’s imputed 
disqualification only when a lawyer has moved from one firm to another” (citing 25 ABA/BNA LAW 
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 420)).   
95. Cf. Kala v. Aluminum Smelting Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ohio 1998) (specifically noting 
that “all cases” require the screen to “be in place when the attorney joins the firm”—it is “too late” to 
screen after the filing of a disqualification motion) with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra 
note 14, at R. 1.10 (a)(2)(i)-(iii) cmt. 10 (outlining screen requirements, including that there be a 
“timely implementation of a screen”). 
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.3 cmt. 4.  See also CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 7-101(A)(2) (reminding lawyers that they shall not 
intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment with clients for professional services unless 
the lawyers withdraw under DR 2-110). 
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.3 cmt. 4. 
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ts 
sho
 court 
found that “the pattern of repeat retainers, both before and after the filing of 
the compla 3   
 
However, if the lawyer has worked for the client for a long time on assorted 
matters, the client may assume that the lawyer continues to serve his interests 
until the lawyer expressly notifies him of withdrawal.98  As Comment 4 
suggests, “doubt[s] about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exis
uld be clarified . . . in writing.”99  Just as with engagement letters, good 
practice dictates that lawyers send clients a conclusion of services letter.100   
In IBM Corp. v. Levin,101 the Third Circuit discussed when a current client 
becomes a former client.  In IBM, the court found that the law firm had an on-
going attorney-client relationship with both IBM and the party the firm was 
representing against IBM.102  Although the firm did not have a specific 
retainer agreement with IBM when it filed its compliant against IBM, the
int, support[ed] the finding of a continuous relationship.”10
VI.  IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE OFFICE 
A law firm is often faced with a malpractice claim that it could have 
avoided by implementing internal controls in its office.  Internal controls help 
ensure that common errors do not occur.104  For example, although 
calendaring errors are a leading cause of malpractice, a firm should be able to 
avoid these errors by establishing an office-wide calendar with a well-defined 
procedure for its use.105  A calendaring system needs to be user-friendly; it 
should be easy to learn, use, and maintain.106  The calendaring system should 
also have an off-site backup in case of problems in the central system.107  The 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
54. 
101. See generally IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978). 
102. Id. at 281. 
103. Id.  See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
825, 840 (1992) (discussing the difficult situation where the lawyer continuously represented a client, 
but was not presently involved in a specific matter for the client and stating that “continuing 
clientship is usually not a relationship ascertainable from the intentions and behavior of the parties, 
but rather a concept imposed with little evidentiary support by a court . . . in order to resolve one or 
another question”).   
104. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.1-,2.4 at 44-58.   Certain organizational controls 
and individual practice procedures  can improve the overall competence of attorneys and the quality 
of the services they render.   Id. at 50-51. 
105. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
72.  
106. Id. at 52. 
107. Id. 
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s and 
wha
les; preventing document loss; 
dev
the firm.117  Additionally, when the firm accepts a new case, it should 
 
system should be able to find discrepancies between the central and back-up 
calendar, and should have a tracking system to know who made change
t changes were made.108  Further, the calendaring system should give each 
open matter a review date so the firm can regularly review each file.109   
Law firms should consider an additional internal control by establishing 
committees to help prevent malpractice and to enhance the quality of work 
performed for clients.110  Just as firms benefit from a managing partner or a 
managing committee, firms also benefit from such “quality control 
committees.”111  The firm should determine the committee’s responsibilities, 
who will serve on it, and the extent to which the committee’s determinations 
are final.112  Possible functions that the committee could perform include: 
considering possible ethical problems; developing a procedure for opening a 
new file; identifying criteria for evaluating clients and claims; establishing a 
billing procedure; maintaining form fi
eloping a policy for referrals, scheduling projects, and events; and creating 
stress and alcohol awareness programs.113  
An important internal control is one aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest.  
Relying solely on lawyers’ memories to uncover conflicts is no longer 
sufficient.114  Instead, firms should have a “systemized procedure for 
documenting and analyzing potential conflicts for every new client and new 
matter accepted by the firm.”115  Conflict-check systems must provide a 
method for matching names.116  If a firm has multiple offices, the names of 
the clients and matters of one office should be accessible by any other office in 
108. Id. 
109. Id.   
110. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 51-52.  
111. Id. at 51-52.  Smith and Mallen suggest several names for committees aimed at preventing 
malpractice, including: “(1) quality control; (2) quality assurance; (3) risk management; and (4) 
professional responsibility.”  Id. § 2.3, at 52.  “Quality Control Committees” or “Quality Assurance 
Committees” are the preferred names because the focus is on increasing quality, as opposed to 
de arry a more positive connotation.  Id.   
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
57. 
al representative, the 
“sp
creasing risk, and generally c
112. Id. § 2.3, at 52-53.   
113. Id. § 2.4, at 55-58 (providing a more extensive list of possible committee functions). 
114.
115. Id.  
116. See id.   
117. Id.  Page 85 features a chart entitled “Types of Names to Track in Conflict System.”  This 
chart gives the list of important people to track depending on the type of representation.  For example, 
for a probate case, the chart suggests tracking the decedent, person
ouse/children/heirs/devisees” and the “trustee/guardian/conservator.”  Id.  
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acce
cuments should be filed daily.125  This 
ensures that documents are not misplaced and that others will know that they 
are looking a
Lawyers should provide their clients with competent representation; 
127 128
circulate a “new matter memo” to lawyers and support staff within the firm.118  
This memo should identify the parties and the intake attorney.119  The memo 
also should state what the case is about and what services the firm will 
provide.120  By circulating the memo, other lawyers are warned ab
pting prospective clients and matters that have conflicts with the new 
client.121   
It also is essential that firms establish a system to ensure adequate 
documentation of work.122  For example, preferably more than one person 
should check the content and accuracy of all documents—such as letters, 
briefs, contracts, and motions—before the documents leave the firm.123  Each 
client and matter should have its own file for all documents the lawyer 
prepares or receives.124  Relevant do
t an up-to-date file.126   
VII.  IDENTIFYING ATTORNEY COMPETENCY ISSUES 
failure to do so can lead to a malpractice action,  Rule 11 sanctions,  and 
 
118. Id. See supra at 58.  SMITH & MALLEN, note 4, § 2.4, at 56 (evaluating a client or 
transaction should “require[] consultation between the originating attorney and another partner or 
com
NDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
58. 
ee SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.4, at 51-52, 55-58.  A law firm’s quality 
assurance committee should oversee “[w]ork control” issues.  Id. at 56-57. 
tainment law may be held to a higher standard of care than other 
law  
mittee”). 
119. ABA STA
120. Id. 
. Id.121   
122. Id. at 59. 
123. Id.  S
124. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
59. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See generally Battle v. Thornton, 646 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1994) (stating that in a jurisdiction 
that does not certify specialists, the standard of care at issue in a malpractice action is that of an 
ordinary lawyer).  Lawyers who communicate that their practice is “limited to” or that they “primarily 
handle” or “specialize in” enter
yers.  See Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1975) (noting that “a lawyer 
holding himself out to the public and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must exercise 
the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity 
specializing in the same field”). 
128. See e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, 2007 WL 1435395, *8 (N.D. Tex. 2007) 
(holding that Rule 11 sanctions against Heslep’s attorney were appropriate for filing a frivolous 
motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorney).  In addition to Rule 11 sanctions, the court may 
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discipline.129  Model Rule 1.1 helps define competency and states the basic 
principle that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.130  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”131  
exercise broad inherent authority to discipline attorneys.  See generally Muzikowski v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 477 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2007).  In Muzikowski, the plaintiff sued Paramount Pictures 
claiming that its film, Hardball, about a little league coach, “was a thinly disguised biography of him” 
and that it was defamatory and placed Muzikowski in a false light.  Id. at 903.  The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant.  It also upheld the court’s 
award of reasonable attorney fees as a sanction against the plaintiff’s lawyers under Rule 37(b)(2) for 
willfully disobeying a court order to identify the documents that the plaintiff intended to use at trial.  
Id. at 909 (holding that “[d]istrict courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions and 
evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees requested” (citing Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 
656
38 P.2d 723, 725 (Cal. 1987) (disbarring attorney 
Ro
 or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a 
law
, 661 (7th Cir. 1999)).  “Rather than comply with the [trial court’s] order, [the plaintiff’s] lawyers 
identified 14,599 pages of documents that they characterized as ‘for possible use at trial.’”  Id. at 909.  
When questioned about their failure to comply with the court’s order, the lawyers “mysterious[ly]” 
claimed the court had never issued such an order.  Id.  
129. See generally e.g., Att’y. Grievance Comm’n v. Midlen, 911 A.2d 852 (2006).  Jimmy 
Swaggart Ministries (JSM) hired attorney John Midlen Jr. to represent JSM for royalty distributions 
by the Librarian of Congress for cable TV broadcasts of JSM religious programs.  Id. at 855.  
Initially, Midlen and JSM agreed that Midlen would deduct his fees from the distribution checks and 
remit the remaining balance to JSM.  Id.  JSM instructed Midlen that it no longer wanted Milden to 
deduct his fees before submitting the royalties to JSM.  Id. at 856.  Milden continued to deduct his 
fees and was fired.  JSM claimed that Milden took months to return its client files and failed to 
provide “understandable legal bills” and an accounting of funds collected on JSM’s behalf.  Id. at 
857-58.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals suspended him from practice for eighteen 
months.  Id. at 853.  Imposing reciprocal discipline, the Court of Appeals of Maryland suspended 
Milden for eighteen months but found insufficient evidence to have the suspensions run concurrently.  
Id. at 867; see also Rosenthal v. State Bar, 7
senthal for his representation of actress Doris Day Melcher, her late husband, and her son because 
of egregious misconduct, such as conducting transactions with undisclosed conflicts of interest, taking 
positions adverse to former clients, overstating expenses and double-billing for legal fees, filing 
fraudulent claims, and giving false testimony).   
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1.  The Code counterpart to 
Rule 1.1 is DR 6-101.  DR 6-101(A) (1) provides that a lawyer must not “[h]andle a legal matter 
which he knows
yer who is competent to handle it.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at 
DR 6-101(A) (1).  In addition, DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3) prohibit a lawyer from handling a legal matter 
without adequate preparation and from neglecting “a legal matter entrusted to him.”  Id. at DR 6-
101(A)(2), (3). 
131. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1.  See Love v. Mail on Sunday, 
473 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2007), for an entertainment law case that was critical of a 
lawyer’s skill, preparation and candor.  The plaintiff, Mike Love, and the defendant, Brian Wilson, 
were members of the musical group, The Beach Boys.  Id. at 1053.  Love alleged that the defendants 
recorded and distributed a CD of Beach Boys songs to millions of people without Love’s 
authorization.  Id.  The CD was distributed in the United Kingdom through the Sept. 4, 2004, edition 
of the newspaper, Mail on Sunday.  Id. at 1053-54.  Love sued for unfair competition under the 
Lanham Act “based on the CD’s use of the Beach Boys photos that included plaintiff’s image, and on 
the use of the phrase ‘The Beach Boys’ on the CD and related advertisements for the CD.”  Id. at 
1054.  The district court held that the Lanham Act did not apply because the allegedly infringing 
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Determination of whether a lawyer is competent to undertake representation 
depends on the complexity of the matter, the lawyer’s experience both in 
general and with the particular matter, the preparation the lawyer is able to 
undertake, and the possibility of receiving assistance from another lawyer on 
staff who is already competent in the matter.132   
Competent handling of a matter starts with the initial client and case 
screening.  The entertainment lawyer needs to realistically evaluate his or her 
knowledge and skill concerning the subject matter of the proposed 
representation.  The lawyer needs to determine whether he or she has 
sufficient experience to properly handle the matter.   
Another important question that the lawyer must consider is whether he or 
she has sufficient time to undertake representation.  Major litigation and 
complex issues generally demand more of a lawyer’s time than simpler 
issues.133  If an otherwise competent lawyer knows he or she cannot devote 
proper attention to a matter, the lawyer should not accept it.134  Model Rule 
1.1 allows a lawyer to undertake representation if he or she can become 
competent through proper study.135  However, a lawyer should be wary of 
hastily undertaking representation in a matter that appears simple but falls 
outside his or her area of expertise or experience.136  The lawyer may not 
 
acts—the United Kingdom CD sales—occurred overseas and granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.  Id. at 1058.  The court sanctioned Love’s attorney $1,000 for misleading and deceiving 
the court and wasting time and resources.  Id. at 1059-60.  The court strongly admonished Love for 
 not breach a fiduciary duty to 
ano
yers attend continuing 
leg
4. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
55.
lay or cost to the client).  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
sup
  A lawyer must know at least the basic elements of the law 
his disingenuous claim of California residency and “submitting a sloppily-assembled opposition 
brief.”  Id. at 1059.  Love’s counsel also submitted a consumer’s Declaration that he had purchased a 
CD in the United States on eBay in hope of demonstrating that the CDs had reached the United States 
market.  Id.  The purchaser was not an innocent and independent consumer but rather someone who 
had been represented by or a co-plaintiff with Love’s counsel.  Id.  The court stated that at a 
minimum, Love’s counsel should have disclosed his relationship with the consumer.  Id.  The rift 
between Love and Wilson resulted in another reported decision.  See Love v. Mail on Sunday, 489 F. 
Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting summary judgment for the defendant, Brian Wilson, 
a member of the musical group the Beach Boys, and finding that he did
ther group member, Mike Love, based on an alleged partnership).  
132. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, 
at 54-56; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (recommending that law
al education programs discussing developments in the entertainment field). 
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at  R. 1.1 cmt. 5. 
13
   
135. The Code counterpart to Rule 1.1 is EC 6-3 (permitting a lawyer to undertake representation 
“if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation” and providing it 
does not result in undue de
ra note 14, at EC 6-3.   
136. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
55.  See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 187 (1986).  “Competence requires a 
fair modicum of knowledge and skill.
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nt 
repr
claim.  The attorney may ultimately pay for the client’s 
proc
 of the client filing a grievance or 
mal
insufficient discovery or investigation.145  The lawyer may not know the 
 
initially appreciate the amount of work necessary to provide compete
esentation and may quickly find the case to be unduly burdensome.137   
Lawyers should avoid the client who brings the lawyer a case in the 
“eleventh hour.”138  A lawyer who handles a case right before the statute of 
limitations expires risks having insufficient time to investigate the matter, 
increases the chance of overlooking claims or parties, and is more likely to 
miss the statute of limitations.139  All of these errors constitute grounds for an 
attorney-malpractice 
rastination.140   
Lawyers should not automatically agree to represent a client because they 
are a family member or a friend.141  These persons are just as apt as other 
clients to have unrealistic expectations about the lawyer’s obligations, efforts, 
fees, and results.142  Although it may seem counterintuitive, effective 
communication with a friend or family member may be more difficult because 
of the personal history of the parties.  Disgruntled clients who are friends or 
family members may even experience a special sense of disappointment or 
betrayal, which enhances the likelihood
practice action against the lawyer.143 
Competency involves adequate research and investigation.  Almost half of 
all malpractice claims stem from substantive errors.144  For example, the 
lawyer may not know or correctly apply the law, or the lawyer may conduct 
involved in representing a client.”  Id. 
137. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
55.  “Yes, you can develop the expertise given sufficient time, but keep in mind that sufficient time 
will be far more than meets the eye at first glance and the client will not be willing to pay for your 
edu .  The ABA opposes “dabbling” in complex areas of the law, and contends that “there 
is n onal injury case.”  Id.     
 
OLFRAM
STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
55.
cation.”  Id
o such thing as a simple will or a cut-and-dried pers
138. Id. 
139. Id.; see WOLFRAM, supra note 136, 186-87. 
140. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
55; see W , supra note 136, at 191-92. 
141. ABA 
 
142. Id.   
143. Id.  
144. See id. at 56 (noting that in 1999 the ABA reported that forty-six percent of all malpractice 
claims resulted from substantive errors). 
145. Id.  See Dimensional Music Publishing, LLC v. Kersey, 448 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Pa. 
2006), for an entertainment law case involving allegations of improper investigation and due 
diligence.  The plaintiff, Dimensional, a limited liability company engaged in music publishing, filed 
suit for a declaratory judgment to determine if it owned exclusively all the rights in the composition, 
“Disco Inferno,” written by Tyrone Kersey and Leroy Green.  Id. at 646-47.  If Dimensional cannot 
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applicable deadlines or may make planning and procedural choice errors.146   
Lawyers may avoid these substantive errors by carefully and thoroughly 
researching the law, by reviewing the work of subordinate lawyers and staff, 
and by consulting experts in the field.147  Lawyers must keep abreast of legal 
developments in their field in hope of minimizing the risk of substantive 
error.148  A firm-wide written policy encouraging and funding Continuing 
Legal Education (CLE) offers lawyers the opportunity to learn of recent 
developments and to fine tune existing knowledge and skills.  Lawyers should 
also consider reviewing closed files and contacting clients when recent 
developments may affect their interests.  For example, an estate planning 
lawyer may wish to contact a former client about tax code changes that affect 
the client’s will or trust. 
A.  Competency Issues and Technology 
Lawyer competence today is increasingly dependent upon the 
understanding and use of technology.149  Technology facilitates greater and 
be the owner, Dimensional alleges the result was a product of malpractice by Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison (Paul Weiss) in failing “to discover and report to plaintiff the risk that there was 
never a valid transfer of Kersey’s renewal rights in the [c]ompositon.”  Id. at 654.  Paul Weiss argued 
tha  was at least a relationship of privity.”  
Id.
ESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
56; 
 changing the financial calculations of the music business and making it profitable to sell a 
rel
t it never represented the plaintiff, but the court found “there
5 at 65 . 
146. Id.; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 136, at 185-88.   
147. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROF
see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that consultations with “more experienced 
entertainment lawyers are common and highly advisable”).  
148. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 
56; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (stating that a “lawyer 
should keep abreast of changes”) cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 
6-2 (noting that a lawyer maintains “his competence by keeping abreast of current legal literature and 
developments, [and] participating in continuing legal education programs”).  The competent practice 
of law also requires lawyers to remain aware of business developments in the industries in which they 
practice that might affect their ability to provide competent representation.  For example, lawyers in 
the music industry need to know about new business models, trends, and deal points concerning the 
digital distribution of music.  See generally Robert Levine, Buying Music From Anywhere and Selling 
It for Play on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at C1 (noting how “the economics of online 
stores is
atively small number of copies of a song,” and reporting about various digital music distribution 
deals).  
149. See DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE 
(2009).  Understanding technology includes appreciating its impact on business models and deal 
points.  For example, in the publishing industry there is a question about who owns the digital rights 
to “backlisted books”—older publications—and how much the rights are worth.  See Motoko Rich, 
Plot Twist for Familiar Works: Who Owns the E-Book Rights?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1.  
Authors contend that it costs publishers much less to publish and release digital versions of works.  
Id.  Accordingly, authors want more than the traditional digital royalty rate of twenty-five percent of 
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faster communication between lawyers and clients as well as with third 
parties, such as witnesses and court personnel.150  Technology also facilitates 
efficient and comprehensive research, the negotiating and drafting of 
documents, the presentation of a client’s case in a courtroom or other 
proceeding, and the storage and retrieval of information.151  These 
technological benefits play an important role in helping lawyers to meet their 
ethical obligation to provide competent representation.152  
The inability to understand and to properly use technology may interfere 
with a lawyer’s ability to provide competent representation.  For example, a 
litigator “who produces electronic documents but [who] does not understand 
metadata is potentially committing malpractice.”153   
Another common technology problem concerns the rapid pace and 
pervasiveness of electronic communication and its concomitant demands upon 
lawyers for immediate advice.154  It is easy for a lawyer to make a 
misstatement or offer questionable advice under the pressure of high paced 
communications.  In general, lawyers should resist knee-jerk replies to emails 
and instead carve out adequate time for reflection and the editing of replies.  
 
net proceeds, which is generally less than they “typically receive on hardcover editions.”    
generally Andrew Adam Newman, A New Novel, Edited Down And Read in a Free Podcast, N.Y. 
Id. See 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at B4 (reporting on an industry first where a publisher, Hachette Audio, 
released for free on iTunes an abridged and serialized audio version of “Transition” by Ian. M. Banks 
in hope of increasing full downloads ($19.95) and hardcover sales ($25.99)); Brain Stelter, Web-TV 
Divide Is Back in Focus With NBC Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at A1 (highlighting that online 
consumption of videos and television streams is soaring and that the television industry’s business 
model is changing to restrict streaming; quoting Stephen B. Burke, the chief operating officer of 
Comcast, ‘“[streaming is] the biggest social movement I’ve ever seen’”).   
150. The ease and speed of electronic communications may heighten concerns about ethical 
violations.  See generally Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009); 
see also In the Nation, Facebook Limit for Judges, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 12, 2009, at A2 
(reporting that the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee opined that lawyers and judges should 
no longer “friend” each other because it might suggest “that lawyers are in a position to influence 
their judge friends”). 
151. See THOMSON, supra note 149, at 46.  A 2006 ABA Survey found “that the percentage of 
firms that had never e-filed a court document dropped precipitously from 70 percent to 40 percent” 
and that one study showed two-thirds of survey respondents started their research with online sources.  
Id. at 48 (citing Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training: Preparing Student for a Rapidly 
Changing Environment, 13 J. LEGAL WRITING 241, 247 (2007)).  
152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1.  These technological benefits 
also promote lawyer compliance with ethical precepts reflected in other rules.  See, e.g., id. at R. 1.3 
(addressing the lawyer’s duty of diligence); Id. at R.1.4 (requiring lawyers to communicate with 
clients).  
153. THOMSON, supra note 149, at 52. 
154. See generally id. at vii –viii (reporting that “[t]he Internet has achieved massive growth” and 
that “[a] generation of students has grown up with the sophisticated and pervasive use of technology 
in nearly every facet of their lives”).  
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 storing electronic information” has prompted one expert 
to w
, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., lawyers were held 
resp
Entertainment lawyers should inform clients as soon as possible about the 
po
Technology has also presented new hurdles to lawyer competency in the 
discovery process.  The “expanding use of electronic communication and the 
relatively low cost of
rite, “ “[t]he discovery process today is . . . drowning in potential sources 
of information.”155   
Lawyers play a key role in the discovery process by identifying, 
collecting, and reviewing information.  Lawyers, clients, and judges all have 
an interest in maximizing the quality of discovery, which often means “using 
automated tools to produce a reliable, reproducible and consistent product.”156  
Thus lawyers are well advised to consult with experts in the storage and 
retrieval of electronic communication in light of the potential for 
malpractice.157  In Qualcomm
onsible for failing to disclose e-mails and other documents that were 
detrimental to their case.158   
Lawyers may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged 
and is relevant to a party’s claim or defense subject to some limitations.159  
tential large costs associated with the retrieval of information.160  “[A] 
 
155. The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information 
Re l
w question,” in a case where the 
de
pta, Dianna Szego & Jennifer Jacobs, Determining When the Duty to Preserve 
Ari
dering a defendant 
in d
trieva  Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 197 (2007) [hereinafter Sedona 
Conference].   
156.  Id. at 199. 
157. United States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 923, 926 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the 
categorization of computer-related evidence is a relatively ne
fendant was charged, in part, with obstruction of justice for deleting emails pursuant to an “email 
‘retention’ policy”).  The court held that the FBI agent’s testimony about forensic computer tests 
constituted expert testimony and not lay opinion.  Id. at 926-27.  
158. See generally Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom, Corp., 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 
2008), vacated in part by Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom, Corp., 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2008).  See Paul Gu
ses and Managing Compliance with the Legal and Ethical E-Discovery Obligations, in PLI 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO 
KNOW 217 (2008). 
159. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (or
a gen er discrimination suit to produce all relevant e-mails including those deleted that were on 
back up disks; providing an excellent discussion of the “proportionality test” under FRCP 
26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii) for shifting the costs of production to the requesting party). 
160. There are several reported cases involving both the retrieval of electronic information and 
the entertainment industry.  See generally e.g., Rowe Entm’t Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 
205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In Rowe Entm’t Inc., the plaintiffs were African American concert 
promoters who claimed that certain booking agencies and promoters had engaged in discriminatory 
and anti-competitive practices.  The plaintiffs made broad requests for e-mail correspondence.  The 
defendants claimed that producing these e-mails was enormously expensive and they sought a 
protective order relieving them of the burden of production.  The court ruled that the defendants had 
to produce the e-mails even if it involved a huge expense because it was likely that they would reveal 
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midsize case can generate up to 500 gigabytes of potentially relevant data 
[which] could cost as much as $3.5 million to process and review . . . before 
production.”161  Both the substantial cost and time involved in producing all 
relevant information in discovery has caused firms to outsource the production 
of information or to depend on their clients to produce the information.  
Although lawyers may outsource their work for e-discovery or have their 
clients search all relevant documents, lawyers are ultimately responsible for 
the production of all relevant information.162 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Lawyers need to continually reassess how they practice law to ensure that 
their work conforms to good practice standards.163  This is especially true for 
entertainment lawyers who work in a highly competitive and rapidly changing 
 
relevant information.  However, the court shifted the cost of production to the plaintiffs.  See 
generally Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364 (C. D. Ca. 2007); 
ction 
of 
A TODAY, Mar. 5, 
20
 protected by Rule 
1.6
0/20, and its task of taking a “fresh look at legal ethics and the 
reg
Columbia Pictures Industries v. Fung, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97576 (Cent. D. Ca. June 8, 2007).  
Columbia pictures sued the owners of various websites for encouraging users to download 
copyrighted materials for free on their websites.  See generally Fung, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97576.  
Columbia Pictures requested that the defendants in both cases preserve and produce electronic data, 
including the IP addresses of the website users.  Id.  The court held in both Columbia Pictures 
Industries v. Bunnell and Columbia Pictures Industries v.  Fung that the preservation and produ
this data was relevant and proper.  See generally id;  Bunnell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364.  
161. THOMSON, supra note 149, at 52.  “[T]he costs of storage have plummeted from $20,000 
per gigabyte in 1990 to less than $1 per gigabyte today.”  Sedona Conference, supra note 152, at 198 
(citing Michelle Kessler, Days of Officially Drowning in Data Almost Upon Us, US
07, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-03-05-data_N.htm).  
162. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. No.08-451 
(2008) (permitting “a lawyer to outsource legal and non-legal support services provided the lawyer 
remains ultimately responsible for providing competent legal services to the client under Model Rule 
1.1”).  A lawyer who outsources work must comply with Rules 5.1 and 5.3.  Id.  Thus, the 
outsourcing lawyer must undertake reasonable efforts to ensure that lawyers or non-lawyers who 
receive outsourced work act in accordance with the outsourcing lawyer’s professional obligations.  Id.  
A lawyer should inform his or her client about the outsourcing of work and obtain client consent 
when the lawyers or non-lawyers performing outsourced work receive information
.  Id.  See generally Eileen Libby, A Qualified Yes, 94 ABA J. 32 (Nov. 2008). 
163. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (recommending that entertainment lawyers conduct 
professional responsibility audits of their practices to ensure that they are complying with state ethical 
codes and noting that records of such audits may be “useful evidence of the lawyer’s efforts to 
comply with ethical standards if the lawyer becomes the subject of a grievance or a malpractice 
action”).  The ABA is also engaged in a major reassessment of existing rules of lawyer conduct 
because of the increasing globalization of the practice of law and “rapid advances in technology.”  
Joan C. Rogers, Agenda for Ethics 20/20 Project Examines Impact of Technology, Disappearing 
Borders, in NO. 25 ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 694 (2009); See also 
Pamela Atkins, ABA Launches New Initiative to Revamp Lawyer Ethics Rules, in NO. 16 ABA/BNA 
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 418 (2009) (reporting about the creation of the 
ABA Commission on Ethics 2
ulation of the profession”).  
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er lawyers from being the 
target of disciplinary and legal malpractice actions. 
 
 
business environment.164  Lawyers must be flexible in adapting to this ever-
changing business landscape, but they must also be resolute in their 
commitment to good practice standards.165  The standards discussed in this 
article will hopefully protect entertainment and oth
164. Tim Arango, G E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go To Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009 at 
B3 (recognizing that G.E.’s acquisition of NBC “reshapes the entertainment industry, giving a cable 
provider a huge portfolio of new content, even as it raises the sector’s anxieties about the future”); 
Jeffrey R. Young, Music Industry Changes Tune of New Program to Fight File Sharing, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 2009, at A12 (reporting about Choruss, a new experimental service led by 
Warner Music Group, that would allow students at six undisclosed colleges to pay a blanket license 
fee, “similar to what radio stations pay to air popular songs,” to download music “to their own 
computers with no restrictions”); Brooks Barnes, After Mickey’s Makeover, Look for a Little Less Mr. 
Nice Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009 at A4 (discussing how Disney is “re-imaging” Mickey Mouse to 
induce “new generations of texting, tech-savy children to embrace him”); Brooks Barnes & Michael 
Cieply, Disney Swoops Into Action, Buying Marvel For $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, at B7 
(describing Disney’s acquisition, and it possibly “herald[ing] a new wave of media consolidation”); 
Jenna Wortham, iPhone Games Give Music Artists New Spotlight, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 26, 2008, 
at C8 (describing how a simple game for iPhone has become “an Internet-age mobile stage for 
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